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Abstract
Regardless of justification, it is commonplace throughout the U.S. criminal
justice system as in everyday life to teach our offenders and children alike that
wrong actions “have consequences,” namely, those authority figures promise to
impose upon them. We do so in the name of holding people responsible for their
actions, or in legal parlance in civil law, holding them accountable or liable. I
noticed that in Norwegian, responsibility, accountability and liability translate
into one word, ansvar, which I have translated from Germanic to Latin roots as
“responsiveness.” In practice, the state of being responsive to others with whom
one conflicts occurs when empathy moves one to recognize and accommodate
the interests of others, in Roger Fisher’s terms, to shift focus from position to
interests, a shift I observed as a victim-offender mediator. When we hold people
responsible, we dictate rules to replace rather than invite and encourage
assumption of responsibility for how ones’ actions affect others; we require
obedience in place of building capacity for self-control. In legal terms, we
adjudicate rather than mediate our differences. I turn from the paradox to
identifying ways in which responsibility is also engendered rather than taken
in our relations, inside and outside the criminal justice system, in our daily
lives. I seek to recognize and encourage transition in our political culture from
control by power over others to control by sharing power with others, in
moments of conflict as in all our moments of cooperation.
Giving or Taking Responsibility
If you are hiring someone, you may well ask of references: Is s/he
responsible? Implicitly, can s/he be trusted if given the power to make
decisions that affect others? That is what my parents wanted to trust in me,
that I would prepare and go to bed responsibly if they left me with a babysitter.
Or when they asked me to repeat after them when I was spending time with
my first cousin, two years my junior, “I will be a responsible leader.” Implicitly,
putting people in positions of responsibility implies trust that they will notice
and be respond empathically, acknowledging both what works for others, and
especially, acknowledging one’s harms and mistakes, adjusting one’s own
agenda or course of action accordingly. People requite, foster or earn trust by
learning how not to repeat their mistakes, including pain and fear they cause
in others. This is a world in which people assume responsibility for the
consequences of their own actions, including redress or remedy for
consequences of their own actions.
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Contrast this to the common-law notion of responsibility: Because I find
you responsible for injury or damage you have done, I will GIVE you adverse
consequences, to teach you a lesson and to make you suffer in retaliation for
the suffering you have caused. You will pay a penalty, you will be punished.
Now, do as I say because I say so. Instead of asking you to be moved by your
feeling for those who suffer your harms, I demand your obedience to my
commands, because I find you irresponsible.
Bottom line: I can try to enable you to exercise responsibility—give you
responsibility—or I can take it away and dictate your choices, orders to follow,
lest I make you suffer further. Giving responsibility offers actors a chance to
respond empathically to those one’s actions affect; responsibility is taken when
obedience to power is commanded (Pepinsky 1998). If you want people to be
responsible, you have to give them room to exercise it.
My quest has been to understand how to invite and welcome
assumption of responsibility, especially in matters of crime/violence—of harm
one causes others. Globally among groups and nations, it is a foundation for
“peace” or “trust-building,” “reconciliation,” “conflict resolution.” In and around
criminal justice, acknowledgment of responsibility for one’s actions is a
fundamental requirement for “restorative justice.” Richard Quinney and I
(Pepinsky and Quinney 1990) have examined work by criminologists who do
and study the process that includes victim-offender reconciliation
“peacemaking” (Pepinsky and Quinney 1991; Pepinsky 2013). Peacemaking
takes hold as we somehow acknowledge and try to help clean up messes we
have made, with one another as in our ecosystem.
Responsibility, Accountability, and Liability
I often find it informative to translate ideas and concepts from one language
to another. The mediator’s practice of “reframing” what someone says is a form
of translation, ostensibly within a single language. When I returned to Norway
in 1986 on a Fulbright to spend time especially with Nils Christie and to study
Norway as a relatively “peaceful society,” I prepared a colloquium presenting
the idea of the class bias in applying the law to those who have harmed others:
Criminal prosecution concentrates on holding underclass people “responsible”;
civil litigation holds predominantly higher-class people “liable”; people who
betray trust from positions of power over others are held “accountable.” In
Norwegian, responsibility, liability and accountability translate into one word,
“ansvar.” In its Germanic roots, ansvar means “answer toward,” which in Latin
translates more clearly in English as “responsiveness,” that is, shifting one’s
idea of what’s at issue to accommodate the meaning or concern underlying
others’ conflicting issues (Pepinsky 1988), manifestation of empathy. Action
driven by empathy is responsive, also known as being or becoming responsible,
assuming responsibility, for the consequences of one’s actions for others. We
know “responsibility” in many terms, in many ways, as attitudes or motives we
impute to what we do. Among practitioners and theorists of restorative justice,
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bringing offenders’ attitude of shame out into the open is a vital part of
offenders’ assumption of responsibility for harm they have done.
Apology as Acceptance of Responsibility
It is often a requirement of formal victim-offender mediation that offenders
apologize for the harms they have done. Writing as an experienced Mennonite
facilitator of victim-offender mediation between Canadian prisoners who have
committed serious violent offenses including rape-murder, and victims or their
loved ones, Gustafson (2017) recognizes offenders’ apologies as a condition
necessary to making meaningful amends to their victims which at least
partially relieve their fears, pain and suffering: acknowledgment of harm done,
displayed in affect as well as in words, making oneself emotionally vulnerable.
Whatever words offenders use, these are the elements which when combined
signify “apology” to victims.
Releasing Shame or Shaming
The most powerful way to shame anyone is by means of violence, just as the
most powerful way to provoke anyone into committing violence is by shaming
him. Our language itself tells us this.—Gilligan (1993)
James Gilligan wrote this from his experience as a psychiatrist treating
those confined as violently, “criminally” insane. Meanwhile, the version of
“restorative justice” known as “conferencing,” with police officers functioning
as well-scripted facilitators, was first introduced in Australia, based on
Braithwaite’s (1989) theory, inferred from Japanese mediation practices, that
transformation of offenders’ behavior entailed their being shamed by their
victims’ pain and loss. This process is illustrated by an award-winning
documentary, “Facing the Demons” (Australian Broadcasting Corporation
1999) of a conference in prison between two men who participated in a robbery
of a Pizza Hut in Canberra in which an employee was shotgunned to death; one
accompanied by his mother, the other by a chaplain; the since-divorced parents
of the victim; and the victim’s co-workers and close friends. The video is
available together with ensuing interviews with participants. In the reception
after the conference, the father of the victim recruits one of the offenders to join
the work of the non-profit he has formed to oppose gun violence. In the followup interview, he reports feeling “lighter” after unburdening himself of the pain
he felt for what he had done. The mother of the victim now remembers him as
he lived rather than being haunted by identifying his body in the morgue, and
generally, as the victim’s girlfriend reports, emerge “happier.” Healing appears
to happen for all concerned.
If the conference in “Facing the Demons” represents Braithwaite’s
shaming process in action, I find it equally plausible to infer that the process
enabled the offenders to release the sense of shame they brought into the
conversation. There is no indication that the facilitator has done any shaming
himself, let alone asked victims to do anything other than to tell the offenders
what they have suffered and how else it makes them feel—anger, questions and
all; in litigators’ terms, he leads none of the witnesses. The crucial point is that
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insofar as shame emerges, it is elicited simply by hearing the fear, pain and
anger—the harm—straight from those you have hurt, and having the chance
to respond, to offer to make amends, to respond to need, to assume
responsibility. It is for social phenomenologist Alfred Schütz (1970) a matter
of “apperception,” attribution of motives we feel or impute to others for our
actions and theirs, which Schütz divides into “because” and “in-order-to”
motives—what makes us do or say what we do, and what we are after. As a
matter of social control, I see this as the distinction between our understanding
of forces that restrain us, and how we pursue honest self-interest, selfexpression, accomplishment…again a case in which we have many words for a
similar attitude. I owe it to my mother, Pauline Pepinsky’s (1970) insight, to
have laid out what became to me as I entered law school the underlying model
for distinguishing whether responsibility is assumed or one is being held
responsible, whether shame is released or imposed, and more broadly, to
distinguish the attitudes toward social control I have called “warmaking” and
“peacemaking.”
Loci of Impulse Expression and Impulse Control
From social science to fiction to everyday life as reported in the news and as
she otherwise encountered it as among newly made friends, my mother (P.
Pepinsky, 1970) inferred that the prevailing political formal and informal
culture of social control in the United States and in Norway differed in one key
respect: In the United States, people typically saw control coming from outside,
implicitly, from the top down; while “impulse expression,” creativity,
achievement and failure thereof, was seen to be in the individual, which she (a
social psychologist by training) called “Mode A” of social interaction, or as I
came to see it, as a paradigm for trying to achieve social control. In Norway,
“Mode B,” by contrast, achievement and failure were gauged by what the group
achieved together (as in reducing economic inequality), and controlled by
people containing themselves from “sticking out,” whether by hurting others
or by displaying wealth, who thrived on cooperation, as in substantial
representation of labor required on corporate boards, and from my later point
of view, dropped to one of the world’s lowest incarceration rates by the end of
the 19th century, where it very nearly remains. The locus of impulse expression
is the group; the locus of impulse control rests predominantly in the individual.
There are many stories about coming home from a foreign culture and
seeing one’s homeland in a new light. I began to see many instances of “Mode
B” ways people had, especially in the supposedly politically conservative
Midwest, in which I grew up and to which I returned for most of my
teaching/learning career. Consider for instance the idea of training for and
promoting “teamwork” in U.S. daily life, from competitive sports to private
enterprises and formal organizations of all sorts. Ideally, you listen and learn
as freely as you participate in creating a group product or idea, measuring
success and failure by what the group accomplishes together, acknowledging
self-discipline in contributing rather than inhibiting the collective enterprise.
Ideally, each member becomes responsible for controlling his or her actions,
over which impulses to restrain (anger? distrust? retaliation? competition?),
and which to offer as one’s own contribution to the common good one
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expresses, in words and in other action—which impulses to express to
accommodate and contribute to the needs and interests of others.
Perhaps Howard Zinn (2015) is best known for pointing out, in the
United States, the usual descriptions of political culture we receive are from a
literate elite, while if we pay attention, “the people” who have inhabited this
country have shown considerable variation, as among the aboriginal
inhabitants of what became the Massachusetts colony, or on the island that
became Hispaniola. From (trans-)national to our personal relations in daily life,
the “modes” of social control we adopt vary considerably, if only we notice.
Mode A and Mode B represent the attitudes toward one another we adopt in
moments of difference including conflict, whether we assume responsibility for
hearing, expressing and addressing consequences of one another’s behavior we
have given and received; or seek to have responsibility imposed or taken by an
outside, superior authority, as by law enforcement and prosecution or parental
discipline.
As in writing social history, we tend to overlook routine ways we
resolve differences in our daily relations, as in conflicts and wanting to do
different things with close and trusted friends, companions and confidants. For
many of us, we respond so habitually with those we trust that we become
scarcely aware, whether or not we find it easy to say “I’m sorry,” that when we
notice our friend’s hurt or anger, we are motivated to change course and do
something to help make it better, to go through steps of acknowledgment of
responsibility and shift course toward trying to repair any hurt or offense,
rather than persisting or ignoring the harm done. It is when our conflicts are
with strangers, or with those we fear and don’t trust, that the elements of the
process of transforming our relations from conflictual to cooperative become
severable as stages of acknowledgment of personal responsibility and
accountability for harm done, to assumption of responsibility for doing
something to relieve the psychic, physical or material damage on one side, and
letting go of the fear and pain one has suffered, a “forgiveness” that transforms
one’s status from victimhood to survivorship, an expression of impulse or
release from inside oneself rather than feeling imposed from outside. In this
paradigm of eliciting rather than imposing responsibility, victims’ forgiveness
(and potentially, collateral victimization suffered by those labeled offenders
too) implies that they throw off something of the control fear and anger has
held over their ensuing lives, while offenders are relieved of being controlled
by shame.
If the process results in resolution of conflict, it is because all parties’
social reality has shifted from one of being controlled by circumstance to
having agency in their relations—to having self-control and the opportunity
to be appreciated and accepted by others for one’s social belonging as one
emerges from the process. For the group in these circumstances, the locus of
control has shifted to each individual, the measure of accomplishment the sense
of safety, security and trust they have achieved together. It is the challenge of
those of us who seek to facilitate this transformation of our conflicts to identify
and create the social conditions under which parties to conflict feel safe enough
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to share the pain and loss, and to assume responsibility for one’s actions and
feelings and their consequences to others, and gain recognition of consequences
one has suffered, to the point at which what has led them to the present turns
focus to discussion of where we go next.
Balancing the Yin and Yang of Social Control
In the West, Lady Justice holds a scale, a balance. Likewise, the basic
Chinese character for “peace,” is a balance, with a people on each side, tilted at
the top to symbolize that dynamically, the balance always tilts between human
forces one way and another. And in classical Chinese cosmology, those social
forces are known as yin—the womanhood, the moon, the silver, creative,
receptive, tacitly cohesive force, and yang—the manhood, the sun, the golden,
dominant, both constructive and destructive force. Justice and peace entail
balancing our dependence on participating in an established social order; and
accommodating and embracing individual and social change—a balance
between accommodating diversity and depending on conformity to social
expectations, between adapting to chaos and imposing order: in Pauline
Pepinsky’s (1970) terms between modes of action in which we control ourselves
to produce results for a common good, or simply live by the rules of feeding,
sheltering, of who’s in charge, and of performing what legal or customary
duties are laid down for us. In everyday life from personal to organizational
levels, we co-exist in a balance between living within imposed order, and
accommodating and embracing change.
Consider the process of successful victim-offender mediation Gustafson
(2017) describes. Participants enter the dialogue speaking for themselves
alone—describing what they have done and what has happened to them,
controlled only by rules upheld by the mediator. When the process works, the
focus shifts toward mutual acceptance of responsibility for creating a way
forward, where the tangible product is an agreement the parties have created
together, where parties have become self-controlled in the process of creating
a joint product.
In turn, terms of agreement are themselves accommodations to
established social and material order. What can offenders reasonably be
expected to do to make amends? Practically speaking, what result can victims
reasonably expect offenders to accomplish, and how can they help it happen
rather than standing in the way or having unreasonable expectations, that
really makes a difference to you? A settlement becomes a synthesis of change
and acceptance of what over time can become a shifting societal balance, as
reflected for instance in sustained decarceration. Occasions for restorative
justice arise when conflict, or social disorder or entropy, becomes heated within
the parameters of established order, and ideally, cools or synergizes the conflict
or chaos into cooperation. As between victims and offenders, it transforms pain,
fear, anger, guilt and shame and distrust into trust and mutual liberation…for
the moment at least—where irresponsibility and its consequences are replaced
by assumption of responsibility by all concerned going forward. It is just that
in the political culture of the United States where the dialogue of control by
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power over others prevails in public discourse, the ways we resolve conflict by
mutual accommodation in our institutions as in everyday life remain yin,
unnoticed, unconscious, so that when conflict becomes overt, we tend to resort
to the yang of assigning blame and holding those blameworthy responsible for
their actions, subjugating them to the will of others by negative and positive
reinforcement, by punishment and extrinsic reward. We all live some balance
of both. In a political culture where the yang of holding people responsible by
reward and punishment (as by incarceration) prevails in public discourse and
action, denial of personal responsibility for one’s actions becomes the
overriding generator of social conflict and disorder. The challenge of
transforming the damage we do each other out of selfish interest and disregard
for those harmed is to set conditions which enable people to acknowledge freely
harm they have done and suffered to one another, and to assume responsibility
for coming to terms which leave everyone involved feeling safer and more
secure—to move from competing to mutual interests. Identifying and creating
processes which enable people to become responsible/liable/accountable for
deciding and doing what it takes to relieve the pain, loss, fear, and distrust at
hand—to become mutually empathic, responsive to one’s another’s needs and
interests. In Norwegian Nils Christie’s (1981) terms, it is a matter of giving
parties ownership of their disputes, disrupted by modernized police failure to
know those they police in many respects. Today it remains manifested in
Norway where mediation mechanisms and boards are available for every level
conflict and dispute in the private and public sphere, from personal to the
corporate levels. For international conflicts, the process of process why which
conflicting groups undertake joint responsibility for coming to terms is
described by Fisher et al. (1992) as Getting to Yes. It is a process of balancing
accommodation to structure as it is, and creative, adaptive response to
emergent social need and circumstance, for the sake of social safety and
security, built on trust, embracing diversity, and assuming ownership of,
responsibility for, conflict management. Holding people responsible for
wrongdoing impedes the process.
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